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CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY
By CHARS W. JOINER. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1962, xviii, 238 pp. $6.95.
According to his introduction, Professor Joiner in Civil
Justice and the Jury purports to help laymen understand and
think about issues involving the trial jury--"issues with which
they may soon have to grapple." Actually the import of the
book is to serve as a brief for the retention-and improvement
-of the civil trial jury as it today exists in United States'
jurisprudence. A foreword by Chief Justice Earl Warren and a
preface by Edson L. Haines, Chairman of the Continuing
Education Committee, International Academy of Trial Lawyers,
set the pace for the brief in pointing up the jury as an important
and vital part of the function of law in resolving disputes in
that it is one of the few remaining governmental activities in
which the community, through jurors, participates. As will
be seen, Professor Joiner admirably carries out this theme in
succeeding chapters.
CivilJusticeand the Juryis divided into two parts: the first is
composed of six chapters which explain the jury as a judicial
and social institution; the second is a collection of various
writings from the pens of Blackstone, Alexis de Tocqueville,
Choate, Holdsworth, Devlin, Sunderland, Blume and Kalven,
among others, most of which are in praise of the jury as a
judicial institution.
It is the first part of the book which will, perhaps, prove to
be of primary interest to lawyers and law students. The first
chapter, entitled "TheJury: Ajudicial and Social Institution,"
is an expertly done summary of the ideas surrounding the theme
that as a device for the resolution of disputes in a democracy
the jury is an institution without parallel. One finds it exceedingly difficult to argue with the fact that nowhere does the
average citizen participate so intimately in governmental
affairs as when he undertakes to serve on a jury. In a day when
the government is growing farther and farther away from the
citizen, jury service is indeed the one area where the citizen can
effectively and conclusively have his say. If this argument is
convincing to laymen who read the book, and if the conviction
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gained from the reading encourages the citizen not to avoid
jury service when he is called, the book will be a success from
this viewpoint alone. Further, it is well that this "democracyin-action" idea is called to the attention of law teachers, law
students and lawyers who often become so mired in the
technicalities of juries, as they relate to procedure and trial
practice courses, that the function of the institution is overlooked.
As an argument for the retention and improvement of the
trial jury, the book adopts an affirmative approach. No direct
attack is made on the views of Judge Jerome Frank, Raymond
Moley or others in agreement with them. Rather there is one
short chapter, called "A Critique of the Jury System," in
which the principal criticisms of the jury are mentioned and
then almost summarily dismissed. These are: arbitrariness,
court congestion, expense, technical evidence and excessive
errors. Many readers will find Joiner's method of handling
these criticisms unsatisfactory. For example, one theme here
recurring (as well as in other portions of the book) is that jury
trial is the best form of trial because it is better than trial by
judge alone. This is supposed to be true because judges, in
hearing over and over again the same type of case, are apt to
become prejudiced and because judges are so aloof and
cloistered that they have lost the common touch. In all
fairness it must be mentioned that Professor Joiner fails to
support these assertions with any concrete evidence. In fact
selections from the writings of Blume and Kalven in the second
part of the book point rather dramatically to the fact that there
is little, if any, difference in verdicts rendered by judges alone

or by juries. And this appears to be so both as regards for
whom the verdict is rendered as well as to the amount rendered
when the verdict is for the plaintiff.
In addition to being supposedly superior to trial by courts
alone, juries are hailed as being instruments of mercy in that
they often disregard bad laws in rendering verdicts. Not only
has this idea been overworked (not solely in CivilJustice and the
Jury, but in other writings as well), it is not as an attractive a
concept as it seems. In the first place it is not the function of
the jury to overlook any law. Its true function is to find facts.
Thus it is not admirable for juries to disregard laws they are
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sworn to uphold. Doing so is a misfunction of the jury system
and doubtless results in much of the criticism heard concerning
the incompetence of juries. Even if it is recognized that the
jury "applies" the law in the rendering of general verdicts, it
is hardly an admirable function for a group of twelve or less
from a small section of a state to take it upon themselves to
repeal what all of the state's people, through their duly elected
representatives, or through the adoption of custom and mores
into the common law, have wished the law to be. True it is
that mercy should temper justice. But whose mercy? What
kind of mercy? The mercy of a jury in Wayne County, Michigan, is not the same mercy of a New York City jury; the mercy
of a rural Oklahoma jury is not the same mercy of an Oklahoma
City jury. Hence "mercy" may prove to be a source of nonuniformity which will take from the law one of its most
important functions-equal treatment for all in similar
situations. Of course this is not to say that mercy has no place
in the administration of justice. It is to say that when mercy is
needed appellate courts, legislatures, Governors and Presidents
are more capable of rendering consistent, balanced mercy than
are juries.
One other criticism demands to be made. In Chapter II,
"Development of the Civil Jury," mention is made of the fact
that in assessing the value of the civil jury reliance should be
had on current attitudes, criticisms and values rather than those
of hundreds of years ago. With this approach there is no
argument. In fact it might have gone further in an attempt to
focus on the jury as a judicial and social institution since
World War II. Surely our affluent society, our expanding
population, our improved transportation systems, and our
ever more penetrating news media provide relevant considerations. Yet it is surprising to find nothing of the sort. On the
contrary, Blackstone's eulogy of the jury, over 100 years of age,
is given. Alexis de Toqueville's work was published in 1863.
Joseph Choate's address was given in 1898. It is true, of course,
that these writings are balanced, timewise, by selections from
Devlin in 1956, from Edelstein in 1956, from Martin in 1959,
and from Vanderbilt in 1956, to mention only a few. Notwithstanding, one gets the impression rather clearly that the latterday writers have not really added anything to what was said
in the last century. It is only when one gets to the excerpts
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from Kalven that any modern-day attitudes are exposed and
they appear still to be pretty much in inconclusive statistical
form.
The purpose of the foregoing criticisms is not to suggest
that Professor Joiner is blinded by glittering generalities about
trial by jury. Nothing, as a matter of fact, could be further
from the truth. It is in Chapter V, "Methods of Strengthening
the Jury," where the idea perhaps most clearly emerges that
the concept of the trial jury as an institution is ideal, but that,
like any ideal, it needs to be refreshed and fortified. Here is
found in thirteen pages a thoughtful, closely-knit and very
clear explanation of what needs to be done in order to preserve
the trial jury and with it all of the inherently democratic values
it possesses. And, again, while not directly attacking any of the
opponents of the jury system, current criticisms are recognized.
Here, though, there is no mere summary dismissal. Rather,
the positive is accentuated by constructive suggestion designed
to make trial juries even more effective than they are now.
These suggestions are: better original selection, screening and
use of jurors is needed; more use of the pre-trial conference
would be fruitful in that it would reduce the number and
complexity of issues for jury trial; less than unanimous verdicts
should be permitted, there being as much of a community
reaction from ten as from twelve people; the number of
jurors could be reduced; instructions to the jury should be
put into "laymen's" language; use of special verdicts should
be liberalized; lawyers and judges should be better trained;
rules of evidence should be liberalized; demonstrative evidence
should find wider use in jury trials; and issues could be tried
separately (what is the use of consuming time on evidence of
damages when the verdict is going to be for the defendant?).
While the foregoing might sound like a call for the revamping of our entire judicial system, it recognizes the fact that
the jury is indeed an integral part of the entire trial process.
It is certainly useless to complain of the quality of jurors when
trial judges give instructions that even appellate judges find
confusing. It is useless to criticize juries as outmoded when
lawyers and judges constantly quarrel over what evidence may
be heard. And it is time it were realized that while unanimity
may be desirable, it is not exactly a fact of life.
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Professor Joiner's suggestions are even more appealing
when it is remembered that our jury system differs little from
the system used when common law pleading was in vogue.
We have improved dramatically the pleading and procedure
aspects of trial work by adoption of code and rules systems.
It is consistent and logical that this improvement of the
administration of justice be carried through to the entire
trial process. It would be foolish and inconsistent not to do so.
In summary, CivilJustice and the Jury is thought-provoking
and realistic. It should give the layman an accurate picture of
what trial by jury is all about and encourage him to participate in its functioning. It will provide an excellent summary for law students and lawyers of fact and argument in
support of retention and improvement of not only a timehonored institution, but one which plays a current and
functionally valuable role in the administration of the rule of
law.
JAMES P. WHYTE

Professor of Law
Marshall-Wythe School of Law
College of William and Mary

